**1. SUMMARY**

The non-profit organization ADRA Czech Republic (ADRA CR) implemented four projects in 2008-2011 of Czech humanitarian aid in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Burma), funded by a donation from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic (MFA) with a total volume of CZK 8 000 000. The purpose of this humanitarian aid was to reduce the consequences and suffering of the local people after the cyclone Nargis, which hit on May 2-3, 2008, particularly in south-west part of the country in an area inhabited by 7 000 000 people. According to official statistics 84 537 died as a cause of this catastrophe, international agencies estimate 140 000‑150 000 casualties.[[1]](#footnote-1) The implementation partner of Czech humanitarian aid was ADRA Myanmar non profit organization. The end beneficiaries were people living in the delta of the Iravadi River (Delta), especially in Pyinsalu division. In the first year, shortly after the catastrophe, 30 757 mosquito nets were distributed to the beneficiaries. In the following years total of 250 temporary and 26 permanent houses were built and 24 buffalos were distributed.

In March 2013 MFA decided to evaluate these projects. The approach of our evaluation team was goal-based evaluation supplemented by the participative evaluation and outcome mapping. The humanitarian projects were analyzed according to the five basic evaluation criteria defined by OECD-DAC. Seeing the specific aspects of humanitarian aid, these criteria were slightly amended especially based on the Principles and Good Practice of Good Humanitarian Donorship to which the Czech Republic officially had signed up.

The case studies of the individual families were planned as the main data processing method. Seeing that the stories of families were very similar and our evaluation team visited more villages than originally planned, we decided to use case studies of individual villages, or more precisely to stress the key topic in each project village. The primary data were sampled especially by questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, group discussions and direct observations. Special attention was given to informal interviews as well. The secondary data are derived from the project documentation, official statistics, other humanitarian project evaluations and articles describing the situation in Burma after the Cyclone Nargis.

**1.2. Major findings and conclusions**

Below is a summary of evaluation conclusions according to the evaluation criteria.

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| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Evaluation criteria** | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | **Total for****project** |
| **Relevance** | High | High | High | Rather high | **High** |
| **Effectiveness** | High | Rather high | Rather low | Rather high | **Rather high** |
| **Efficiency** | High | Rather high | Rather low | High | **Rather high** |
| **Impact** | High | Rather high | Rather low | High | **Rather high** |
| **Sustainability** | N/A | Rather low | Rather low | High | **Rather low** |
| *Cross-cutting principles of the Czech ODA* |
| **Gender** | High | High | High | High | **High** |
| **Environment** | N/A | High | High | High | **High** |
| **Governance** | N/A | Rather high | Rather high | High | **Rather high** |

**Evaluation scale**

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| High | Rather high | Rather low | Low | N/A |

**Relevance**

The relevance of the project was evaluated as **high.** Cyclone Nargis caused one of the most serious natural catastrophes in recent years. The Burmese government did not acknowledge the scope of the catastrophe for a long time and was consequently refusing foreign aid and entry of foreign humanitarian aid workers to the affected regions. MFA promptly organized endorsement of funds for humanitarian aid for Cyclone Nargis´ victims. As soon as the political situation allowed, MFA reacted fast and approved the ADRA project for the purchase of mosquito nets (together with 2 other projects of other NGOs). On June 16, 2008 ADRA received a donation of 2 000 000 CZK into their account. According to Burmese witnesses, local coordination of aid in the affected areas was the biggest challenge (United Nations World Food Program took charge of coordination after 2 months) alongside with the extremely limited and difficult access to the remote villages.

Aid that was delivered by ADRA in 2008 to Burma (mosquito nets from Thailand) can be considered as highly relevant and reacting to the immediate needs of the people. ADRA membership in the international network was proved as a huge advantage, as ADRA Myanmar already had been allowed to work in the affected areas (during their humanitarian aid to tsunami survivals in 2004). Because of this, ADRA started helping the victims as early as the 5th day after the strike of Cyclone Nargis. The following projects 2009-2011 were also evaluated as highly relevant, as they helped the local inhabitants manage the disastrous time when they had lost not only their families but also their houses and livelihoods. The selected projects areas are till date very difficult to reach. From this point of view ADRA Myanmar did an excellent job. The end beneficiaries were selected by the respective Village Development Committees. In some cases (project 2011) however, some doubts about the selection process were revealed (aid relevance was evaluated as “rather high” in this case). ADRA Myannar promised to look into these cases. The scale of beneficiary participation on project identification was not possible to verify. Results of the interviews however suggest that the end beneficiaries could not influence the shape of the houses.

**Effectiveness**

The effectiveness of the project was evaluated as **rather high**. The planned outputs were fulfilled in all the projects (number wise). In 2009, 10 extra temporary shelters were built than planned. The project goals were fulfilled partially, especially because the quality of the houses (especially in 2009 and 2010) did not correspond with the project documentation and could not reach to the goal of “secure and long term functional” shelter for the recipients. Nevertheless, the evaluation team is of the opinion that the goal of “improving the housing situation of the victims” was reached, seeing the desperate need of the people for shelter. The beneficiaries were taught about security measures in case of any next emergency. Because they actively participated in material transport and building and assisted to the hired carpenters, their skills were strengthened. By this, another goal of project was fulfilled (however the shelters did not correspond to the security standards). **The timeliness of the aid was evaluated as adequate, with the exception of 2010**, when the plan to build “secure and long term functional” houses was not fulfilled. 2 years after the catastrophe, we would not expect building temporary shelters but would expect emphasizing buildings of lasting nature.

ADRA Myanmar cooperated closely with other stakeholders of humanitarian aid and actively utilized their outputs for beneficiaries (UN-HABITAT materials, Action Aid/UNDP trainings etc.). **The coordination with other donors was evaluated as sufficient.**

**Efficiency**

The overall efficiency of the project was evaluated as **rather high**. The mosquito nets were relatively good quality and were bought for a good price; therefore ADRA was able to purchase a higher amount than planned. In 2009 there was a clear tendency of the implementer to help to as many families as possible, at the expense of material quality. As years went by, fewer houses were built and they were of better quality. The houses built in 2011 fully fulfill the criteria of UN-HABITAT including the DRR standards. The houses built in 2010 are problematic (not consistent with the security criteria, unsuitable plots allocated by the local authorities). ADRA however acted economically/efficiently by involving end beneficiaries and volunteers into the building process. The building was carried on during the rainy season and harsh conditions every year. In addition to that, there was a severe lack of material in the area, the prices and exchange rates were continuously changing, which made management and planning very difficult.

**Impact**

The impact of the project was evaluated as **rather high**. The project apparently contributed to reduction of diseases caused by mosquitoes (malaria, dengue fever) suffered by people living in camps after Cyclone Nargis struck. 250 temporary houses and 26 permanent houses were built in 7 villages which facilitated the Nargis victims the transition from the emergency shelters to these houses. The project also contributed to strengthening their building skills, hygiene habits and readiness to any eventual future natural disaster. 12 families received replacement of buffalos that they had lost during the cyclone and by that got an opportunity for livelihood (unfortunately 6 buffalos died). The presence of ADRA Myanmar workers and their personal enthusiasm had a positive impact to the people´s return back to normal life.

On the other hand, in some villages people expected more aid and their dependence increased (which has to be seen in context of other donors operating in the area). Some needy families, who did not receive a house, suffer by a feeling of injustice and inferiority. The location of the new village Na Lin Kyaw (2010) was selected by the local authorities inappropriately because the inhabitants cannot engage in their traditional livelihood there (fishing) and it is located in paddy fields which are regularly flooded (negative health effects). Also the temporary shelters built in 2009 and 2010 require financial costs for renovation and maintenance.

**Sustainability**

Sustainability was evaluated as **rather low.** The regular care, which the houses built in 2009, 2010 and 2011 require, collides with the difficult situation of the beneficiaries. After the cyclone, the natural environment changed (nipa leaves needed for roofing are scarce, lack of bamboo, soil salinization, decrease of fish etc.) and the local people therefore lost ways of livelihood. This results in lesser income and possibility to maintain their houses. Only few of them are able to save money for necessary maintenance (decaying poles, damaged floors, decaying walls, decreasing house area that a family can inhabit). In Ahway Kar village about 30 households face a challenge regarding free use of the land on which their houses were built. Na Lin Kyaw inhabitants on the other hand move their houses (despite the official prohibition) back to their original village by the sea, as it is their source of livelihood (however according to the official rules, the beneficiaries own the house only as long as they live in it). ADRA Labutta pointed out on the life style of some beneficiaries (fishermen-migrants who are not used to taking care of their houses) and on certain passivity (being used on inflow of aid from different donors). It is necessary to add that ADRA Labutta operates in the present in only a few chosen areas and does not monitor houses built in 2010 and 2011. The system of the buffalo banks seems to be set in a transparent and sustainable way. During the evaluation time, it was not possible to fully analyze as no calf had been born yet.

*The cross-cutting principles of the Czech ODA*

**Gender:**

Gender was considered in some cases when choosing the beneficiaries (e.g. widows were given a priority in some cases). Women were represented in the Village Development Committees (around 20-30% women in VDCs with which the evaluation team had a group discussion). The evaluation team did not find about any human rights abuse.

**Environment:**

Natural materials like bamboo, palm nipa leaves and wood were used for building the new houses. The evaluation team did not find any cases of environment damage caused by the project. ADRA Myanmar operates in some areas and implements environmental projects, e.g. planting mangroves alongside the beaches that should protect the villages.

**Good governance**

In 2008-2010 ADRA had to work during the former political regime and had to respect the decisions of the local authorities, even though they were questionable sometimes. Also ADRA had to follow rules in order not to endanger its future operation in the area. In the present the cooperation with the Labutta and Pyinsalu authorities is smooth. Within the communities and their own team, ADRA follows democratic principles.

**Recommendations towards the project and continuation of the development cooperation**

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| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Type of recommendation** | **Recommendation** | **The main addressee** | **Severity**  |
| Towards the project  | Thoroughly analyse the key assumptions and risks of each project (on all levels of project logics).  | ADRA ČR | 1 |
| Towards the project  | Watch over the quality of construction works and keep the standards of UN-HABITAT.  | ADRA ČR in cooperation with ADRA Myanmar | 1 |
| Towards the project  | In projects of this type pay attention to the ownership of land on which the temporary or permanent houses are being built.  | ADRA ČR in cooperation with ADRA Myanmar | 1 |
| Towards the project  | In projects of this type verify the selection of the recipients.  | ADRA ČR  | 1 |
| Towards the project  | Verify the beneficiaries of houses from 2011 (and if the houses are used) and if necessary, arrange for correction.  | ADRA ČR in cooperation with  ADRA Myanmar | 2 |
| Towards the project  | Create a reserve for repairs in the budgets when planning for building shelters.  | ADRA ČR | 2 |
| Systemic  | In the later phases of humanitarian aid, support project activities relating to further development cooperation or stressing the support of self-reliance of beneficiaries after the project termination. | MFA  | 1 |
| Procedural | Consult the timing of evaluation with the implementing party or other stakeholders. Adequate time needed for the whole evaluation process.  | MFA  | 1  |
| Systemic | Implement English as the official language of evaluation reports.  | MFA  | 2 |

1. OSN, ASEAN and Government of the Union of Myanmar: *Post-Nargis Joint Assessment*, 2008, str. 38. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)